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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
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tl1e clerk of the cou r t, an<l at least t\\'o cop ies ma iled o r de-
live red to opposing counsel ou or befo r e the day 0 11 wh ich t he 
brief is iile<l. 
Vi. S1zE AND TYPE. Briefs sha ll be Hi ne inches in length a nc1 
s ix inche:; in widtl1, so as to conform in d imensions to U.10 
p rin tc<l r ecor d, and sl1111l be printed in type no t less in size, 
as to height and width, than the ty pe in which the record is 
p ri nted. Tlic record m1mht>r of the c:ase nnd names of coun-
sel sl 1all l,c priu tcd on the front CO\'Cr of all b r iefs. 
:.\f. B. "\VA 'l"I'S. Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjourns at 1 :00 p. m. 
! i • 
__, 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
This case probably will be called at the session of 
court to be held E£8 1949 
You will be advised later more definitely as to the 
date. 
Print names of counsel on front cover of briefs. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
RULE 14-BRIEFS 
1. Form and contents of appellant's brief. The o pc11i11g brief o f t he appellant (or 
the p c t.i t io n for appeal when ad ()p tcd as the o pcniu g br ief) sh a ll con tain: 
(a ) 1\ subject index and t ab le oi c itations w ith cases a lphabetically arranged. 
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a s~ig n ed, a n d the questions invo ln:il in the appea l. 
(e) :\ c lear aml conci;e stat,m<!nt o f the facts , with r eferences to the pages o f 
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lll l ' llt. \ \'hcrc the facts a r e co11tn:>,·c rtc<l i t s ho uld be so s ta ted. 
(d) A 1p nm11t in suppo r t of the pu s i,ion o f appc:llan t. 
'l he brid shall be sig11e,I by a: lea~t o ne atto rn ey pral'.lic ing in th is cour t, g iving 
his add ress. 
The appe ll an t m ay a dopt th e f> l'tition for a p pea l as hi s opcn ing br ief by so slatin g-
in the pd it ion, or l.,y gi\'ing lo o pp o$ing counsel wri t!l'n no t ice o f s uc h inten tio n 
with in fi \'t: day, o i the r ecvip t hy a p pdlant o i th <! r,rin tt·d record. and hy lilin,; .;. 
copy o f such notice \\' it h the c h:r k o f the cou rt. N o a lkgcd error not s p ccihcd m the 
o pu1i11g brid or pe tition for appe.11 sh:,11 be a dm itted as a groun d ior a rg ument by 
appdl:u1t on the hearing oi the can st·. 
2. Form and contents of appellcc's brief. T h <! urid for the appc llce sh a ll conta in : 
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(c) A statrn1en t of t he facts which arc n ecessa ry t o co r rect o r amplify the ~tatc-
m e11t in appt•lla111's b r id in ~o far as it i~ <il-~me<l err<.HWOtb o r inad .:!qua t e, with ap-
p r oµ riatc rd-:rv1cc to the pa~~i.:~ of I Jr,, rC'cord. 
( rl) :\ rgument in support o f th e po~ition of appdlec. 
T he lirid :.;tall be s igned b y a t least 0 th! at torne y prac:ticing in this co ur t, g h ·:n,:: 
h is a ddress. 
3. R eply brief. T he reply brief { if any) of t he a p;,cll:111: ~hall con tain all tl ,e a,1• t horit i,·s .·t·l i .. <l on by him, not rcicrrl'd to in h is petition or up,·n ing b ri<:i. In o t he r 
n::~1·ccb it shat! co11form to the rl'qu irrn1,·11ts for a ppdle<''s br ief. 
4. T im e of fil in g. (a) Ci..-ii tasrs. The opc11ing brief of th ..: a ppellant (i f t hen ! he 
on e in add it ion to the petition f01· app,~;!I) s ha ll be fikcl in th e clerk's ofli r c wit hin 
fi ft een davs afkr t he rt:ce i1\t by coun ~d fo r appellant of the print ed record, h ut in nn 
e\·ent ll'ss tha n th irty cla y s lw fon: the fi rst day of th l' ~e ,,,io n a t which t h <: ,a~e 
is to be lw:1nl. T he br ief of the appeI J,•c sh a ll be filed in t he cler k's o nice no t la ter 
th :, n fi f teen ,lays, and the rq1ly hrid uf th e appel b n t noi late r than o n e day bcfor <! 
th e.: fir,t da\' oi the sc :;sion at wh ic h the ca,c i , to h<: hl'arcl . ' 
(b) C:11~11i1111/ Ca.,cs. In crimin:il case:~ b1 id ; m ti,;t k ii k•d wi1 h i11 (he t im,~ spe t'i fi ,·,J 
in civil r.1,t,; -irovi1lccl, h owe\' l'r, t ha t in tho,e ca ,<:', in ,, h ich the reco rd,; ha\'e 11,,t bl'Cn printnl a nd ddi \'trcd to <'Olm ,cl at lc:1,t t\\'Cll ty- fi\' c d ays hdore the bc.c:innin~ 
of the next ~··~~io11 o f the court. s ud 1 nscs ,h:d l h<' r•l ac,•d at th e· foot n i the docket 
[or t h:d ~,·,,ion o i t he court. an,! l h l· C.H11 mnnwcal th\ hrid s hal l be lilt'd a t k ast ten 
clavs prior lo the call ing o f the ca~e. :llld t he reply hrid f,x the plain tiff in 1.:rror no t 
lat.er tha n the d:,y bdore the ca se is r:ill cd. 
( c ) S tipu/nti1111 of cn1111scl as to f iliHf/· Counsel for nppns ing parties m a y file w ith 
Lhc ckrk a \\T1 l tu 1 slip ula \i<?l1 c il a u;i in g- the t ime for fi l ing hr id ~ in a ny case: pro-
vider!. lto,,·C',·t•1·, t hat all bntts mus t be fikd n o t later than the <lay befor e rnch ca, c 
is to he heard. 
5. Number of copies to b_c filed and d elivered to opposin g counsel. T wenty cop it·s 
1f carh hrid slt;1'.J be fi led ,,·1th t he cl r-rk ,1£ th e court, and al k a ~t tw o copies m ailc:cl 
:ir cldivcr,·cl to 01,nosing co1rnst· l nn or hdorc the day on wHch the brid is fi led. 
6. Si.:c and T ype. Brief, sh:ill be. 111ne inches 111 le•1;{,h :in d s ix inche; in ,dd th, so 
1s to coniorm i11 di m en si,.,n, •,, tilt· printed record, a nti sh~ II be print !' tl i11 !\'pc n ot J,·,s 
:n siz<". a, 10 h •,igh t and \\';dth , t'. ,an the •.ypc in w hic-!1 the rc:cord i~ p,:inkd . '!' he 
,·c·co rd n um ht'r o f th t case an d n a 11i.·~ of co11nscl sha ll be rrint,·d o n th e front cover o f 
l ll IJricf,-. 
7. Non-compli:mce , effect of . The ckrk of !hi ~ C<•t1 1 t i ili1 ,·ct, rI no t to l'l'<'t·in · or 
ii lc a h rid \l'h ich fai ls to comply wi il1 Ill<' nquin .'mt•n rs r,f this 1 ulc. Jf n either ~id t: 
1,;,s filed a pro per b rief t he c:rn"' \\';II no t h t• hea r~. , I f one o f 1lw Partie, fai l, 10 file 
1 prClp t'r hrid he cannot be h~·ard , .h nt the case w ill oe heard ,·.r furl .: upon th ~ a rgu -
n ent of the party by whom tne b nef 1:as been fi led. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3506 
JOE PARRIS, Plaintiff in Er.ror, 
t·ersus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR . 
AND SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
. Virginia: 
. Your petitioner, Joe Parris, respectfully represents that he is 
aggrieved by a final order,or judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Washington County, entered on the 28th day of June, 1948, 
whereby he was convicted of seduction on his plea of guilty, and 
sentenced to a term of two years in the penitentiary. (Tr., 
2* p. 22-23.) A transcript of the *proceedings accompanies 
this petition. · 
THE PROCEEDIKGS. 
At the May Term, 1948, of said coµrt an indictment was re-
turned against petitioner for seduction of Dorothy Mae Gentry. 
(Tr., p. A-1.) · ' 
On June 3, 1948, the defendant ple.aded guilty, but the court 
deferred sentence. (Tr., p. A-3.) 
• 
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Before the defendant was sentenced he filed his motion on June 
28, 1948, for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty entered on June 
3rd, which motion set forth the existing circumstances, and the 
motion was duly sworn to by the defendant. Also, on the same 
day, June 28, 1948, the. defendant filed additional statements 
under oath as to his grounds for withdrawing his plea of guilty. 
(Tr., p. A-9.) 
The argument and proceedings on defendant's motion to with-
draw his plea of guilty are contained in the Certificate of Ex-· 
ceptions, beginning at p. 1 of the transcript and ending at p. 21. . 
The refusal of the court to allow the defendant to withdraw 
his plea of guilty is the subject of this petition for writ of error. · 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court erred in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his 
plea of guilty and .to substitute therefor a plea of not guilty. 
3* *FACTS 
The facts with reference to defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea of guilty are contained in the motion filed June 28 
1948, and the additional statement of ·grounds filed on the same 
date. (Tr., pp. A-3 and A-9.) 
At the time defendant entered his plea of guilty he had been 
assured by the· prosecutrix that she was willing to marry him, 
and he was also advised by his counsel that the marriage would 
be a complete defense to "the proseoution, provided it took place 
before sen~ence. All the time there had been a complete under-
standing between the defendant and prosecutrix that the mar-
riage would take place, but following the- plea of guilty the de-
fendant was ad vised that the prosecutrix had then stated that 
she had him where she wanted him and would put him in the peni-
tentiary; and not until the morning,of June 26 did defendant 
lea~tely that. _the_pr.osaC_ll.trix-wonJd Be..tLmar.ry_~m, 
th~ying been stated by the attorney for the Common-
w~alth. (Tr., p. A-5.) At the time the plea of guilty was 
entered, the attorney for the Commonwealth stated that if de-
fendant would marty the prosecutrix he would nQi_b.e.-punished. 
But for this understanding the defendant would not have entered 
his said plea. (Tr., p. A..;6,) 
4* *At Tr., p. A-6, the defendant denies under oath that he 
is guilty of seducing the prosecutrix, and avers that he has a 
defense to the indictment, but under all the circumstances he 
was willing to marry the girl and be recognized as the father of 
the child. Def enda.nt certainly, in all good faith, thought that 
under his plea of guilty and under the circumstances existing 9tt 
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the time the plea was entered, he would not be punished by a 
sentence to the penitentiary. 
Defendant averred his good reputa.tion and offered to present 
to the court ample test.impny of witnesses as to his good char-
acter. 
In Par. IX, Tr., p. A-7, it·is averred that h:is plea was entered 
through inadv~rtence, mistake, misconception, misunderstand;.. 
ing, or hope of working out his situation without a trial, and that 
his plea was entered inadvisably. He asked for a trial upon the 
merits and proposed to enter a plea of not guilty, and the plea of 
guilty was not asked to be withdrawn for the purpose of entering 
any dilatory or formal plea, but for the purpose of seeking a trial 
upon the merits. 
During the progress of the argument on the withdrawal of 
5 * the plea it was suggested that the defendant could not *marry . 
the prosecutrix because he had previously married one Ruby v 
Barr. This alleged marriage took place on._Febr.uarJZ: 19.J-948, 
at which time defendant knew nothing of the pregnancy of the 
prosecut,rix, she had never made any complaint to him, and be 
did not know that he was in any way involved· in an alleged 
seduction with Dorothy Mae Gentry. (Tr., p. A.:.9.) The foster 
parents of Ruby Barr, upon learning of her attempted marriage 
to the defendant, were greatly ew:a,ged and consulted. counsel 
with reference to having the marriage annulled because Ruby/,. 
Barr was under sixteen years of age, and at .the time of the en-
trance of the plea of guilty the defendant was advised and 
thought that the ioster parents were proceedmg to have tnemar-
riage annulled. -It will he obvious to the court here that as soon 
as th~f guilty was entered both the first wife and the foster 
parents of Ruby Barr, thinking that "they had defendant where 
they wanted him," proceeded to pursue the prosecution. ~.11 of 
which appears in defendant's additional statement on grounds to 
withdraw his plea of guilty. (Tr., p. A-9.) 
No counter-affidavit was _filed by the prosecutrix or anyone, 
but in the argument on the inotion to withdraw the plea there 
6* are statements made by the Commonwealth's *Attorney, 
his assistant, defense counsel, and the court. The transcript, 
beginning at p. 5, contains the statement of the attorney for the 
Commonwealth. In the course of the argument by the attorney · 
for the Commonwealth, he stated \ Tr., p. 6) that the prosecutrix 
had told him that the defendant had told her that Ruby Barr . 
was pregnant by him. This statement was absolutely denied by 
defendant's counsel. (Tr., p. 10.) 
The situation was regarded by the court as an unfortunate 
one, the court stating that "to send this man to the penitentiary 
is not going to help the prosecuting· witness, it ·is no~ going to 
help the child if it is born, it is not going to help his present wife 
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or her child, if she has one." The court then, of his own accord, 
knowing the whole situation, suggested the following (Tr., p. 13): 
"I would like to hear counsel on this idea: That the court 13uspend 
imposition of the sentence for a brief period and request that 
probation and pa.role officer make a report to the court as to the 
advisability or exp:ediency of a suspended sentence, etc." The 
court suggested that the imposition of the senten~e be suspended 
. for a sufficient period "to give the officer an opportunity to 
7 * investigate and report back *to the court. This was cer-
tainly the right and privilege of. the court and, knowing more 
of the circumstances than are revealed in cold type, it was his 
feeling that the matter deserved 'farther investigation. 
We respectfully suggest that when a trial court before imposing 
sentence and, knowing as many of the facts as revealed to 
have been known to him in this case, suggestes of his own accord 
a suspension of sentence or probation, it is a· rather harsh act on 
the part of an attorney for the Commonwealth. to oppose it, 
especially when the defendant has denied under oath that he is 
guilty, when no evidence has been taken, when no sentence ha." 
been imposed, and when the defendant is begging for a trial on 
the merits under a plea of not guilty. '\\nen this court reads 
the trial court's remarks, it is ,~entured that it will come to the 
.conclusion that the trial court refused to suspend the imposition 
of sentence for a time so that the probation officer could act, not 
because he wanted to sentence the prisoner, but only upon the 
harsh insistence of prosecuting counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
The question of withdrawing a plea of guilty has been the 
8* subject of many judicial opinions from various courts. *In 
certain States it is controlled by statute. · In some juris-
dictions the withdrawal of the plea is freely allowed before sen-
rence, but not after sentence. In Virginia the authorities seen 
meagre, unless we have overlooked some vital ruling case in our 
investigation. Practically all of the States, in the absence of 
statute, frown upon the withdrawal of the piea-~pose of 
entering· dilatory pleas or formal defenses or engagingiri":prac-
tices for the purpose of delay. . 
'In the instant case, we may remark that nothing is more 
n()ticeably outstanding than the fact th.at while the prosecution 
energetically proclaimed the absolute guilt of the defendant, yet 
they seemed afraid to go to trial on the merits under a plea of. 
not guilty, although there is no intimation in the record of the 
proceedings that any and .all witnesses were not available. We 
can readily understand that in a case where a defendant pleads 
guilty and the witnesses become unavailable, it would be totally 
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unfair to the Commonwealth to allow a defendant to take ad-
vantage of such a situation by· allowing him to withdraw a plea 
of guilty, and some of the cases we have read mention this situa-
tion, but that is not the case here. 
No evidence was heard on the plea of guilty. The 
9* *court, at p. 9 of the Transcript, recalls correctly what hap-
pened when the plea was entered. He said that he might. 
want to hear some evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the 
proper punishment, but he did not do so. 
In Early's Case, 86 Va. 921, at p. 924, it is said: 
"The settled doctrine, however, is that the judge may permit 
a plea to be withdrawn, and another one substitut~d, whenever 
by so doing he does not violate any positive rule of law or of estab-
lished practice. But such a discretion will rarely, if ever, be 
exeycised in aid of an attempt to rely upon a merely dilatory or 
formal defense." 
In this case the trial court was not asked.to violate any positive 
rule of law or of established practice, nor was the defense sought 
to be interposed merely dilatory or formal. 
In 14 Am. Jur., Sec. 287, page 961, the following general prin-
ciples are laid down with reference to the withdrawal of a plea 
of guilty: 
"Sec. 287. Circumstances Warranting Granting or Refusal of 
Withdrawal.-As in other cases of discretionary power, no gen-
eral rule can be laid down as to when a defendant will be per-
mitted to withdraw his plea. The decision in each case must 
depend to a great extent on the particular attendant circum-
stances. Generally, however, it may be said that the withdrawal 
of a plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is 
in the least evident that the ends of justice will be subserved by 
permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place. The least sur-
prise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when 
10* he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds *for 
permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty. 
Leave should ordinarily be given to withdr.aw a plea of guilty if 
it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature 
of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through 
fear, fraud, or official misr~presentation; was made involuntarily 
for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly, if any rea-
sonable ground is offered for going ·to the jury. If such a plea 
has been received by the court without observance of the pre-
cautions and solemnities required by law, the court should per-
mit the plea to be withdr~wn. On the other hand, if a defendant, 
with full knowledge of the charge against rum and of his rights 
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and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea under-
standingly· and without fear or persuasion, the court may, with-
out abusing its discretion, ref use to permit him to withdraw it." 
And in 14 Am. Jur., in Sec. 288, at page 961, the following is 
stated: 
"Sec. 288. Time of Withdrawal.-The holdings of the various 
courts are not uniform as to the time of the withdrawal.of a plea 
of guilty. A plea of guilty may, according to the general rule, 
be withdrawn at any time before judgment or sentence. In 
some jurisdictions the plea may be withdrawn either before or 
after judgment or sentence. ~ere the case is submitted to tlie 
jury on some collateral issue, a plea of guilty.may be withdrawn 
at any time before the retirement of the jury. · 
"In some jurisdictions· the view is taken that to warrant the 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty after verdict there should exist 
such-reasons as would be sufficient to justify the granting of a µew 
trial. 
"In many jurisdictions tp.e matter is controlled by statute." 
Perhaps no better statement of the circumstances justifying 
· granting of leave to withdraw a plea of guilty can be found . 
11 * than in 8 Am. Eng. Annotated Cases, at page 238, which 
follows: 
"As the withdrawal of a plea of guilty is within the discretion 
of the court, and as this discretion is exerdsed upon the facts of 
each particular case, it is difficult to lay down a general rule 
covering all the circumstances under which a plea of guilty may 
be withdr~wn. However, it has been held that the withdrawal 
of a plea of gµilty should not be denied in any case where it is in 
the least evident that the ends of ;'ustic~ would be subserved b'lj per-
mitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place, and that the least . sur-
prise or influence causing a defendant to plead guil~y when he has 
any defense at all sould be sufficient cause to permit a change of 
~ plea from guilty to not guilty.'' 
In the case of State ·v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535, it is said: 
.. "The law is not composed of a series of snares and pitfalls for 
the unwary, neither does it favor what Judge Bliss terms 'snap 
judgment.' If these remarks apply~ a civil case, then, a fortiori, 
do they apply in a criminal prosecution where the liberty of the 
prisoner is at stake." 
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There is no showing in this case whatever that the ends of jus-
tice would not he subserved by permitting the substitution of the. 
plea of not guilty, and, as was said in the case of Krowlage v. 
People, 224 Ill. 456: 
"The withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be denied in 
any criminal prosecution where it is evident that the ends of jus-
tice would be subserved by permitting the substitution. of the 
plea of not guilty." 
12 * *For the foregoing reasons your petitioner respectfully 
prays that a writ of error and supersedeas be awarded him; 
that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Washington County 
be reviewed and reversed; and that defendant be permitted to 
withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, to the 
end that he may have a fair trial on the merits. 
A copy of this petition is being mailed to Ralph E. Boucher, 
Esq., Attorney for the Commonwealth, Abingdon, Virginia, and 
T. L. Hutton, Esq., Associate Prosecuting Attorney, Abingdon,. 
Virginia, both opposing attorneys of record. 
Permission is requested for oral argument on this petition. 
· In the event a writ of error is allowed, this petition will be re-
lied upon as the opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, this October 26, 1948. 
JOE PARRIS, 
By Counsel. 
H. E. WIDENER, 
JNO. C. SUMMERS, JR., 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
13* *I, H. E. Widener, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that I have 
examined the record accompanying the foregoing petition and 
also the said petition, and in my opinipn there is error in the pro-
ceedings, for which the same should be reviewed. 
Given under my hand, this 26th_ day of October, 1948. 
H. E. WIDENER. 
Received October 27, 1948. 
A. C. B. 
November 19, 1948-Writ of error and superBedeaB awarded. 
No bond required. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of W ashlngton County. 
. . 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
v. . 
Joe Parris. 
Be it remembered that on the 24th q.ay of May, 1948, the 
jurors of the Special Grand Jury, empanelled and sworn in for 
the body of Washington County, in the State of Virginia, returned 
the. following indictment against Joe Parris, which indictment 
and further proceedings had thereunder are as. follows, to-wit: 
INDICTMENT. 
Virginia-Washington County, to-"\\iit: 
The Jurors of the Special Grand Jury, empannelled and sworn 
in and for the body of Washington Count,y, in the State of Vir-
ginia, at the term of the Circuit Court held in and for said county, 
conµnencing on Monday, the 24th day of May, in the year of 
Christ 1948, upon vheir oath present that Joe Parris on the 
day of August in the year of Christ, 1947, in the County of 
Washington aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of the Court 
aforesaid did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously seduce 
and have illicit connection with one Dorothy Mae Gentry; an 
unmarried female of previous chaste character, having promised 
the said Dorothy Mae Gentry on the aforesaid day uncondi-
. tionally to marry her, the said Dorothy Mae Gentry, 
page A-2 ~ against the form of the statute, against the peace 
and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia. . 
Presented upon the information of the following witnesses, 
sworn in Court, and sent by it to the Grand Jury: Dorothy 
Gentry, T. C. Gentry, Mrs. Clint Gentry. · 




Indictment for Seduction 
A TRUE BILL. 
LOUIS F. ARNETT, Foreman. 
Filed May 24, 194$. 
C. N. BOOTH, Clerk. 
Joe Parris v. Commonwealth of Virginia 
page A.:.3 ~ ORDER. 
(Entered June 3, 1948.) 
9 
This day came the defendent in person and by counsel, and 
came also the attorney for the Commonwealth. Thereupon ~e 
defendant was arraigned and upon his arraignment pleaded 
guilty; and the defendant and the attorney for the Common-
wealth having waived trial by jury, the Court proceeded to hear 
and determine this case without the intervention of a jury. 
Thereupon the Court heard the evidence, but not having arrived 
at his decision thereon takes time to consider the same. 
WALTER H. ROBERTSON, 
Judge. 
MOTION.· 
(Filed June 28, 1948.) 
Now comes the defendant and moves the Court for leave to 
withdraw his plea of guilty entered at a former date of this term, 
on the 3rd day of June, 1948, on the following grounds: 
I. 
On the above date when the case was called for trial defendent 
had been assured by the prosecutrix that she was willing to marry 
him, and he was also advised by his counsel that the marriage 
would be a complete ·defense to the prosecution. He, in good 
faith, thought that the marriage could be consum-
page A-4 ~ mated, and on the said date, and before entering his 
plea of guilty, through his counsel, he seriously .sought 
a continuance of the case and seriously moved the court for a 
continuance until said marriage could be consummated. The 
Commonwealth's Attorney seriously opposed any continuance 
and insisted upon a plea of guilty, with the understanding that 
if said marriage should take place the prosecution would end, 
whereupon, in good faith, defendant pleaded guilty, with com-
plete confideI1ce that the marriage would take place,· as he was 
anxious and willing to marry the prosecutrix. Upon the de-
fendant's plea of guilty, the Court did not sentence defendant, 
· but left tlte matter open until further notice. At a later date 
defendant was aavisect by his counsel that the Court desired the 
presence of the prosecutrix and the defendant, together with all 
counsel, on Saturday, June 26, 1948, on which date the attorney 
for the Commonwealth announced that the prosecutrix abso-
lutely declined to marry defendant under any c~rcumstances. 
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On the day defendant entered his plea of guilty, and immedi-
ately thereafter, he approached the prosecutrix with reference to 
discussing the marriage, and was flatly told, to his surprise, that 
she would not ·discuss the matter with him at all and had been 
advised not to do so, all of which was a great surprise to de-
fendant inasmuch as there had been a complete understanding 
between defendant and her, following his indictment and previous 
1 to his plea of guilty, that the marriage would take 
page A-5 ~ place. After the last mentioned approach to .the 
prosecutrix with a view to arranging said .marriage, 
defendant repeatedly attempted to get her to agree to the mar-
riage. At all times the defendant was acting upon the advice 
of his counsel, and at the time the plea of guilty was entered it 
was understood between counsel for the prosecution _and de-
fendant through his counsel that the plea of guilty was entered 
in the hope of consummating a marriage with the prosecutrix 
and ending the prosecution, and defendant would not have so 
pleaded except for the purpose of a voiding a trial. 
Defendant has been advised through others, but not directly 
through the prosecutrix, that after his plea of guilty she stated 
that she then had defendant where she wanted him and would 
put him in the pe.nitentiary. Defendant had hoped, even 
after the refusal of" the prosecutrix to talk to him on the day when 
his plea was entered, to get the prosecutrix to agree to the mar-
riage, and thought it might be done until it was flatly stated by 
the attorney for the Commonwealth on the morning of June 26th 
that under no circumstances would the prosecutrix agree to the 
marriage. His only recourse then was to ask for the withdrawal 
of his plea of guilty and be permitted to enter a plea of not guilty 
and go to a trial on the merits. 
III. 
It was ~d by _the attorney for the Commonwealth at tJip 
1 timeclefendant's plea of guilty was entered-that if he 
page A-6 ~ should marry the prosecutrix he would not be pun-
ished, and but for this understanding the defendant 
would not have entered his said plea. 
IV. 
Defendant denies that he is guilty of seducing the prose-
cutrix, and avers that he has a defense to the indictrri'ent in this 
case, but under all the circ~tances as known to him he has 
been ready and willing to marry the prosecutrix since said prose-
"'· 
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cution commenced, be recognized as the father of her child to be 
born, and do all in his power to make her a good, faithful and 
dutiful husband. 
V. 
In Court and at the time defendant's said plea was entered it 
was stated by the attorp.ey for the Commonwealth that if the de-
fendant and the prosecutrix should marry, then the prosecution 
would end, and defendant thought, in good faith, that the prose-
cution would be ended; otherwise his plea of guilty would not 
have been entered. 
VI. 
Defendant says that he is twenty-eight years of age, and the 
prosecutrix is twenty-one years of age. 
VII. 
Defendant avers that he bears a good reputation; is not dissi-
pated; is a hard worker so far as his health will permit; has 
never been arrested for any offense; and offers now 
· page A-7 } to present to the Court ample testimony of witnesses, 
who have known him, as to his good character. 
VIII. 
Defendant avers that when he entered his said plea he was fully 
confident that said marriage would take place, and had he had 
any reason to believe that it would not, his plea would not have 
been ent~red, but knowing that he was willing to marry the 
prosecutrix and relying upon her protestations that she desired 
to marry him, he entered his plea of guilty. 
IX. 
Defendant is advised that if his ~aid plea was entered through 
inadvertence, mistake, misconception, misunderstanding or hope 
of working out his situation without a trial, or even if the plea 
was entered inadvisably, then he is entitled to withdraw the same 
in the interest of justice to all concerned and have a trial upon 
the merits. 
Defendant avers that this motion is in good faith for the pur-
pose of entering a plea of not guilty, and is not made for the pur-
pose of entering any dilatory or formal plea of defense, but for 
the purpose of entering a plea of not guilty, seeking a trial upon 
the merits as to his guilt or innocence. 
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Defendant avers that after conferring fully with his counsel 
and others, he was led to believe that the entering of said plea 
by him would result in an end to the prosecution, and 
page A-8 ~ that but for his belief in good faith that such would 
result he would not have entered said plea. 
Wherefore, defendant makes this mofam to withdraw his said 
plea of guilty with leave to enter a plea of not guilty. 
· JOHN C. SUMMERS, Jr., 
H. E. WIDENER, 
Counsel for Defendant. 
JOE PARRIS. 
State of Virginia, County of Washington, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, J. Hugh Buck, a 
Notary Public for the State of Virginia at Large, Joe Parris, who. 
being duly sworn, made oath that he has read the foregoing 
motion and that the facts therein stated are true, except wherein 
they are stated to be upon information and belief, arid as to such 
he believes them to be true. 
My commission expires August 29,' 1948. 
Given under my ban~, this the 28th· day of June, 1948. 
J. HUGH BUCK, 
Notary P~blic. 
page A-9 ~ ADDITIONAL STATEMENT,IN GROUNDS FOR · 
WITHDRAWING PLEA OF GUILTY. 
(Filed June 28, 1948) 
The defendant says that on February 19, 1948, at which time 
)le knew nothing of the pregnancy of the prosecutrix, he mar-
ried or attempted to marry one Ruby Barr. At the time of said 
marriage to Ruby Barr he had learned nothing of the pregnancy 
of the prosecutrix, nor had it until that time occurred to him 
that .the prosecutrix would marry him because of the violent 
antagonism of the mother of the prosecutrix , to said marriage, 
the mother having often said that it could not take place. After 
his marriage to Ruby Barr, .for the first time the charge of se-
duction of the prosecutrix was made against the defendant. 
Also, upon · his marriage to Ruby Barr, her foster parents 
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were enraged and consulted counsel with reference to have said 
marriage annulled, stating that the said Ruby Barr was under 
16 years of a.ge at the time of the marriage. Defendant is ad-
vised that said foster parents consulted counsel, who advised. 
them that the marriage could· be annulled, and at the time said 
plea was entered by defendant he, in good faith, thought that said 
foster parents were proceeding on behalf of the said Ruby Barr 
to have the said marriage annulled: . 
These facts were well known to the attorney for the Common-
wealth, who stated to defendant's counsel that in his opinion 
the marriage could be annulled without undue delay and leave 
· defendant free. to marry the prosecutrix. It was 
page A-10 } under these circumstances that the defendant en-
tered his plea of guilty, hoping to marry the prose-
cutrix, avoid the prosecution and satisfy the demands of the foster 
parents of Ruby Barr. As to whether or not said foster parents 
are now desirous of having their foster daughter proceed with the 
annulment of the marriage, defendant is not advised, but he is 
advised that said foster parents are showing great interest in 
this prosecution and have consulted attorneys with reference to 
ascertaining whether def end ant could be prosecuted criminally 
for his marriage to said Ruby Barr. 
Charles Barr, the foster father of Ruby Barr, has told de-
fendant to his face that he intended to see that defendant went 
. to the penitentiary if he could have his way. 
Defendant prays that this statement may be read as a part 
of the affidavit this day filed. 
JOE PARRIS. 
Sta.te of Virginia, 
County of Washington, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, J. Hugh Buck, a 
Notary Public for the State of Virginia at Large, Joe Parris, who 
being duly sworn, made oath that he had read the foregoing 
stateµient and that the facts therein stated are true, .except 
wherein they are stated to be upon information and belief, and 
as to such he believes them to be true. 
My commission expires August 28, 1948. 
Given under my hand, this 28th day of June, 1Q48. 
J; HUGH BUC~, 
Notary Public. 
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page A-11} NOTICE. 
(Service Accepted) 
(August 20, 1948) 
To Honorable Ralph E. Boucher, Attorney for the Common-
wealth, and ·T. L. Hutton, Esquire, also representing the Com-
monwealth in above styled case: 
You are hereby notified tha~ I will, on the 26th day of August, 
1948, at Abingdon, Virginia, at 5 :00 P. M., or as soon after as 
I may be heard, present to the Honorable Walter H. Robertson, 
Judge, for hls approval and .signature, the bills or certificates of 
exception covering the proceedings and incidents in the matter 
of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Joe Parris. 




JOHN C. SUMMERS, JR., 
H. E. WIDENER, 
Counsel. · 
We hereby accept due and legal service of the above notice, 
this 26th day of August, 1948. 
Virginia: 
R. E. BOUCHER, 
Attorney for Commonwealth, 
T. L. HUTTON. 
In the Circuit Court of Washington County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
v. 
Joe Parris, Defendant. 
ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW .HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
Before the Honorable Walter H. Robertson, Judge. 
Appearances: Ralph E. Boucher, Esq., Abingdon, Virginia; 
T. L. Hutton, Esq., Abingdon, Virginia, for the Commonwealth; 
~ohn C. Summers, Esq., Abingdon, Virginia; H. E. Widener, 
. Esq., Bristol, Virginia, for the Defendant. 
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June 28, 1948. 
page 2} PROCEEDINGS. 
A formal motion in writing, signed and sworn to by the de-
fendant, Joe Parris, for permission to withdraw his plea of guilty 
and enter a plea of not guilty in the above case was tendered the 
Court by his counsel, Messrs. Summers and Widener. 
Mr. Hutton: We don't agree with the contents of this, your 
Honor, at all. I can state my position very briefly. I think, 
as a matter of fact, he should be penalized for filing this affidavit. 
Here is a married man who comes into court and, with the advice 
and consent of the ablest counsel in Virginia, after reflection and 
mature consideration, says he is guilty. He understood the 
nature of that plea and had the advantage of very able counsel, 
and then when he comes here a month later and files this affidavit" 
I think he should have additional punishment·. 
He is in no position to marry the girl. She is a fine girl and is 
going to have a baby. They, ove.r·our objection, asked for time 
and the court took the matter of.punishment under advisement. 
He has never been in position to marry the girl, and he is asking 
this court to allow him to go back and get an annulment or some-
thing from the girl he did marry and marry this girl. He says 
this girl wouldn't talk to him. How could she when he had a 
wife? I think his punishment should ·be increased rather 
page 2 } than diminished on account of that affidavit filed here. 
I don't think he has stated the facts at all, as neither 
the Commonwealth nor myself made any agre~ment with him. 
How could she talk to him about marriage and h~ complain to 
this court that ·he acted in good faith, when ·he already had a 
wife? He is asking this court to ditch the wife he already has, 
and I don't know if he can get a divorce or not. Now he comes 
here and says, "If the court please, I didn't understand the 
nature of my plea.'' He know.she is guilty and he stood before 
the bar in this court and entered that plea of guilty, and now he 
says that because that little girl who sits here today and is going 
to have a baby by him, because she won't talk to him, he wants 
the plea withdrawn. 
The Court: I don't believe that affidavit refers to the fact that 
he is married. I think maybe there should be a counter affidavit. 
Mr. Hutton: We just read this about two minutes ago. We 
could file a counter affidavit thathe is a married man. 
Mr. Widener: I will state now that we originally dictated a 
paragraph embodying that fact that your Honor wants a aounter 
affidavit on. I have no objection to its going in. In view of the 
authorities, we were not of the opinion, and I am not yet of the 
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opinion, that it has anything to do with the right to withdraw 
a plea, whatever the reason for it. We studied that affidavit 
very carefully, and we might have gon~ further in it t~an 
page 4 } we did. I think the affidavit entitles the defendant to 
withdraw his plea, regardless of the situation with 
reference to the other girl. As to that, I suppose I was certainly 
among the first who ever mentioned that to the court at the pre-
liminary of these hearings. We have· tried to conceal nothing 
and have no~hing to conceal whatever. If anybody should be 
punished for preparing that affldavit, I will take the full conse-
quenc~s of it. . . 
The Court: That point is not bot4ering me. The situation is 
a right difficult one. 
Mr·. Widener: I have the authorities, which I believe it would 
be in order to take up now, and if you want any counter affi-
da:vit-
The Court: I don't think the court ought to pass on the record 
that doesn't give all the facts. It was certainly stated then that 
he was married and that he thought the marriage could be an-
nuled, and he entered the plea of guilty. The court certai!llY 
didn't ask him to enter such a plea, but the court did take it 
under advisement at his request. The court certainly can't help 
him to annul that other marriage. 
Mr. Widener: There is nothing in that affidavit. that indicates 
that the court agreed to anything or that anything was sug-
gested by the court. I was very careful to avoid that, and 
thought I was staying within the proprieties of the case. 
I would like to amend the affidavit and include in there our 
understanding of the facts in connection · with the 
page 5 ~ other girl. I will . ask now to amend the affidavit to 
. include that. · 
The Court: You may do that. 
(Thereupon, the· paper entitled "Additional Statement in 
Grounds for Withdrawing Plea of Guilty" was dictated to the 
reporter, written, signed by the defendant, and tendered to the 
court.) 
~ .Mr. Boucher: If the court please, I would like to answer this 
/1"/' affidavit as filed. 
In Paragraph I of the defendant's original affidavit it is stated 
that the Commonwealth's Attorney seriously opposed any con-
tinuance and insisted upon a plea of guilty. It is true the Com-
monwealth's Attorney did insist upon the case being tried, but 
that the plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily given by de- _ 
fendant after advice of counsel, and was not insisted upon by the 
Commonwealth, nor was it suggestetl by the Commonwealth. 
The facts of the matter are,the Commonwealth was only asking 
for .trial, and had its witnesses ready and was ready and waiting 
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on trial; that the defendant knew long in advance of the com-
mencement of this prosecution that the prosecutrixwas pregnant, 
and that,he went to the-prosecutrix and told her that he had been 
compell~d to marry Ruby Barr; that he also had Ruby Barr 
pregna:nt, and that he married the younger one. This is the 
statement that was made to the Commonwealth by Dorothy 
May Gentry, the prosecuting witness. The defendant 
page 6 ~ knew this at the time he made his plea. The Com-
monwealth denies that any inducement of any nature 
was held out to the defendant, that it was expressly understood 
by counsel for defendap.t that his plea of guilty was just what it 
purported to be-a plea of guilty-and that the consequences of 
.his plea were well known to him. 
In the latter part of Paragraph II of the original affidavit,, it 
is stated that the attorney for the Commonwealth on the morn-
ing of June 26th stated that under no circumstances would the 
prosecutrix agree to the marriage to the defendant. It is a fact 
that prosecutrix does state that she will not marry the defendant. 
He has told her that he has his present wife, formerly Ruby 
Barr, pregnant, and has not denied this to her until to.day. 
Paragraph III of the original affidavit states that the Com-
monwealth .stated that if he should, marry the prosecutrix he 
would not be punished. This statement is incorrect and was not 
made to the -knowledge of the Commonwealth's Attorney, and 
it is his understanding of the matter that it was stated by counsel 
for the defendant that this was the only "absolute defense" that 
they had, and that is why they were making it. No inducement 
was offered by the Commonwealth whatsoever in r.egard to 
the plea. · ; 
Paragraph V of the original petition states that the Com-
monwealth stated that if the defendant and prosecutrix 
page 7· } would marry the prosecution would end, and the de-
fendant thought in good faith that the prosecution would 
be ended, otherwise his plea of guilty would not have been en-
tered. No such assurance was ever made to the defendant or 
anyone, ·and the facts about the matter are that nothing was 
asked by the Commonwealth whatsoever, except that the case 
·be put to trial on the day it was set for trial. 
The additional affidavit filed this the 28th day of June states 
that the foster-parents of Ruby Barr consulted counsel in regard 
to having the marriage of Joe Parris and their foster-daughter, 
Ruby Barr, annulled. The Commonwealth's Attorney states· 
that he believes this to be true, and that such proceeding was 
con~eropl!tf b~ the foster-parents of Ruby Barr; that, however, 
when they alkea-to the Commonwealth's Attorney about it he 
advised them that they should first ascertain and determine 
whether their foster-da.ughter, Ruby Barr, was pregnant or not. / 
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He h·ad information that she was pre'gnant by Joe Parris, he ad-
vised them of this~ft. The Commonwealth's Attorney 
further states that he at tpat time did have information that 
Ruby Barr was under.1.6._y_e_§,l'_S_.Qf age. As. I understand it, she 
came from an orphans' home, and the. definite date otlier.=:birth 
was not ascertained. However, a birth certificate was obtained, 
either by the defendant or at his insistence, so I am told, and that 
Ruby Barr's age was found to be over 16. 
page 8 ~ Paragraph III of the defendant's additional state-
, ·: ment this day filed states that the attorney for the Com-
. monw.ealth stated to defendant's counsel that in his opinion the 
v,marriage·could be annulled without undue delay. This statement 
/
isc11ot in exact accorJlan.ce w:ith-t.ae-f.a.cts. I told counsel for the 
defendant that Mr. and Mrs. Barr had approached me and that 
they had stated they di ot know the exact a of the foster.:. 
dau hter but they thought s e er. J6. What action 
counsel ·for t e an too m re ar his information, I 
do not know. The proceedings in this cause were had before 
the court, and the motion for continuance was made to the court. 
After the motion for continuance was rejected, thereupon the 
defendant entered his plea of guilty in open court, with knowledge 
of all the facts and circumstances in the case, and that no hope, 
inducement or mercy was held out to him, and at that time, after. 
the plea was entered, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated in 
open court he wou~d not ask for a sentence of more than two 
years. 
The Court: Does that statement go in the record as your state-
ment? You are not making an affidavit? 
Mr. Boucher: Just the statement. . 
The Court: I want to say to counsel on both sides that if my 
memory is bad I will appreciate it if counsel will correct me. 
As I remember the situation, when the case was called 
page P. -~ counsel for the accused moved for a continuance until 
the September term of court on the ground that marriage 
of the accused might be annulled, and if so, accused thought the 
prosecutrix would marry him, and that he was willing to marry 
her if the other marriage were annulled. 
The court did not feel that it could take any part in that 
proposition at. all, because the wife was not here, and I certainly 
would not want to say or do anything that might prejudice her 
in any way. 
When the plea of guilty was entered, as I remember it, the court 
said that he might want to hear some evidence for the purpose of 
ascertaining the proper punishment. If I remember, counsel for 
the prosecution said that they were only asking for the minimum 
penalty. 
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That is my recollection of what happened. I don:,t know if I 
have stated it correctly or not. 
I suppose the matter is now before the court on a motion to 
withdraw the plea of guilty and permission to enter a plea. of 
not guilty? 
Mr. 'Widener: Yes, sir. 
The Court: That motion is supported by the affidavit and the 
additional statement. On the statement of the Commonwealth 
in opposition thereto, my opinion is that the eourt will have to 
overrule the motion. 
. Mr. Widener: At this point I would like to make a 
page 10 ~ statement in reply to Mr. Boucher's statement. 
The Court: I thought you were through. 
Mr. Widener: It was repeatedly said during the preliminary 
talk on the d~y when the case was called for trial that the matter 
of working out the proposition and doing justice to everybody 
ought to be done if it could be done. We understood that the 
foster-parents of the other girl in the case were· very violently 
opposed to the marriage of the gi.rl, that .they had consulted 
counsel with reference to having the marriage annulled, which is 
embodied in the statement in the affidavit just filed. We were 
assured by the defendant that he had talked to the prosecutrix 
following the indictment on many occasions, and that he w~ per-
fectly willing to marry. We deny for the defendant, and he is 
ready now to make affidavit to it, that he ever told any human 
being that Ruby Barr was or is pregnant, and we deny that she is. 
We got the information from her when the matter was first sug-
gested by the Commonwealth's Attorney. She ought to know. 
He got his information from. the prosecutrix, he says, and from 
no other s·ource. 
It was stated over and over again that if a marriage could be 
arranged, that, of course, it would end the prosecution. The law 
itself ended the prosecution. We advised him under the circum-
stances as we saw them and as they are embodied in the affidavits 
filed by him. We advised him if it was true, and we thought 
it was true, that the Barrs were going to have the 
page 11 ~ marriage annulled, that he marry the other girl, and 
that he would run no risk in filing a plea of guilty under 
those circumstances. Under those circumstances.he did file the 
plea. 
I believe your Honor has said in the course on these hearings 
on Saturday that it was probably a rrrlstake to have entered the 
·plea under the circumstances. I hope I am not misquoting any-
body. . . I / 
. Now, there is a· case in Virginia which holds that where a mar-fv 
riage was in prospect and the man had a divorce suit pending a 
mensa and it had not been completed, that the Trial Court erred :• 
·:·: .· ···i, 
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in forcing the trial until that divol'ce was filed in obedience to 
the mandates of the law, that the law favors marriage and the. 
legitimacy of children. · . 
This, I may say, is an unfortunate situation and a tangled 
situation, and I cannot see any harm, if he be guilty, in having a 
trial under all the circumstances as disclosed here and as is known 
to everybody, and if your Honor will let me, I want to read you 
one or two authorities on that. 
The Court: Well, I can't refuse to let you do it, Mr. Widener, 
but I can tell you know I don't believe the authorities are going 
to convince me. 
·M·r. Widener: I understand, but I will read just one. I think 
it is fair to the court, fair to our client, and fair to ourselves. 
The Court: Read it. 
page 12 ~ · Mr. Widener: It is a statement on page 961 of 14 
American Jurisprudence. 
"Generally, however, it may be said that the withdrawal of a 
plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is in the 
least evident t4at the ends of justice would be subserved by per-
mitting not guilty to be ·pleaded in its place. * * * Leave 
should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was 
entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of 
the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through 
fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily 
for any reason; or ev.en where it was entered inadvisedly, if any 
reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury." 
The Court: I think you have· a terribly complicated situation 
here. The statement that. the Court has m~de that probably 
the def end ant had made a mistake in pleading guilty, I don't 
think would be affirmed at this present time by counsel for de-
fendant, but inasmuch as counsel for the defendant says I made 
it I doubtless did. 
I think this defendant is represented by two very able counsel, 
one of them not having had a great deal of experience; the other· 
one has had years of experience in criminal law, and I regard him 
as one of the ~blest counsel in the State of Virginia. I don't 
think it is fair for a man to come here under those circumstances 
and plead guilty to a charge like this, and after tha 
page 13 ~ Court has taken it under advisement at his request, 
and _after he has found out that possibly the prosecu-
ting witnesses are moie antagonistic than. he thought, to be al-
lowed to ask to withdraw his plea. 
As far as I am concerned, I am sorry he plead guilty. It is· 
an unfortunate case for a man. To send this man to the peni-
tentiary is not going to help the prosecuting witness, it is not 
' 
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going to help the child if it is born, it is not going to help his 
present wife or her child, if she has one. It is not going to do 
anybody any good except to, as far as possible1 convince the peo-
ple. · of the community that our laws were not put on the statut:; 
books as a mere form. , 
I am going to overrule the motion to withdraw· the plea· o . 
guilty, to which I suppose the defendant will except. 
I would like to hear counsel on this idea: That the Court sus- · 
pend imposition of the sentence for a brief period and request 
that probation and parole officer make a report to the Court as 
to the advisability or expediency of a suspended sentence. I 
. think the defendant deserves some punishment, and yet I think 
that is a question, and to send him to the penitentiary might re-
sult in a greater pun~hment for some of the others than for this 
defendant alone. 
I would like to heru.· counsel if they want to be heard on the 
idea of suspending the imposition of sentence for a sufficient 
period to give the officer an opportunity to investigate and re-
port back to the Court. 
page 14 t Mr. Boucher: I guess the Court would like for me to 
speak first on that. I will object to this procedure. 
My feeling in the matter is this: that he knew this girl was 
pregnant, a fine girl, an honorable girl-he was the only boy she 
ever went with. He knew all these facts, he knew that he had 
her in trouble, he ran out on her and µiarried another girl. I 
don't think that his conduct is such that a suspended sentence 
should be granted. I think he should be punished for his actions. 
The Court: I think he deserves punishment unquestionably. 
He has pleaded guilty, but I am considering very seriously 
whether that punishment might not do more harm to other peo-
_ple than it would do him good. 
Mr. Widener: I don't think I can add anything to what the 
Court has said on that. It is my idea exactly. I might be going 
too far in this case. I know how serious attorneys get, and some-
times unfair, and how prejudicial they get. I do have a good 
deal of emotion in this matter. I have known the parents of 
Parris since we were boys. This Joe Parris has had a violent 
heart attack, but is a hard working boy. I have talked to people 
we all know about his reputation and character. I will say he 
is not the smartest boy in the world, nor perhaps the most in-· 
telligent, but I can't find any better boy when it comes to work-
ing and att~nding to his business~ I have not talked to any 
of his own peopleJ but have tried to investigate among 
page 15 } the good citizens fu the community where he lives, and 
I can't see why going to penitentiary would help him 
unless he had some criminal tendency.· That is what probation 
is for, and I. think probation is nothing for us to object to. If the 
• 
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facts warrant it, I certainly think it is a question in the discretion 
of the Judg~1 based upon facts and not upon the objections of 
interested parties. I think the'f might be carried away by 
prejudice against the boy, as I might in his favor, and I think 
it is certainly a matter your Honor should dispose of in the man-
ner suggested, and if it is not a case for probation he, of course,. 
should not be probated. · 
I do say that it was a tangled affair 1 an unfortunate a:ff air, and 
it is altogether probably-and·, as I say 1 I am going to take the 
blame for that-that it was my lack of the understanding, of the 
appreciation of what might happen, that led this boy into enter-
ing this plea. If I had said, "Don't do it," I tµink he would 
have taken my advice, and his father, also, but I was trying to 
work-put something for all of them. 
The. Court: I don't know whether you gentlemen understood 
my suggestion. It was merely probation for a short or reason-
able period to give the probation officer time to make a pre-
sentence report. I don't know what would be the Court's views 
after that. That is a practice that is used a good deal in Virginia 
now, and I don't want the defendant nor the prosecution nor 
anybody else to think that I have a great deal of 
page 16 t sympathy for this defendant. It is a pity for him to 
get in this, but I do think it is a serious thing to send 
a man to the penitentiary when it would probably do more harm 
to innocent people than it would do good to him. It can't help 
if these two expectant mothers have a child of his. Neither one 
of those children would be benefitted, nor would the mothers. 
On the other hand, I know that the Commonwealth has a great 
burden in these· matters. The officers are diligent and are doing 
everything they can to bring law-violators to the Court, and 
sometimes it is discouraging to them when the Court is too 
lenient. The only thing the Court can do is to do what he thinks 
is best under all the circumstances. If the Commonwealth ob-
jects, I am inclined to sustain the objection, although I think it 
is not a private affair. The prosecuting witness can bring a 
private suit for damages, but this is a matter for the public, and 
the Court has to sit here and, as far as possible, give impartial 
justice to both sides. Sometimes· it is a very hard thing to do. 
I don't know if you unc;ierstood that I simply thought it might 
be well not to sentence the defendant for a reasonable period, so 
the probation officer could have time for examination. 
Mr. Boucher: Yes, I understood that. 
Mr. Hutton: I will state my position to the Court. As it 
appears to me, and I might pause to remark that it is a rare 
thing I appear in prosecution-I know this girl. I 
page 17 ~ know this boy's father. .The little girl is a very fine 
little girl, about 19 or 20 years old, and s~e has been 
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going with this boy and she said she loxed him and he loved her, 
and their courtship had lasted for , three or four· years. I don't 
know anything about the other girl being pregnant, but this 
young ma~ should not be allowed to select one of the two, and 
then come here and beg, and I think it is a detriment to society . 
. This girl lives in a good community, her father is dead, and her 
mother is a fine old lady, and there is no finer boy in Glade Spring 
than this girl's brother here. I sincerely think the young man 
deserves punishment and deserves it now. I may be wrong, but 
as I stated a while ago-I didn't mean it to be flattery.:_this 
defendant is represented by two distinguished trial lawyers, one 
of whom is the most outstanding in the State, and I think he 
entered that plea because he thought it was the easy way out. 
·we have insisted on the minimum ·only, and I think it would 
serve no good purpose to have him go back out and say, "I am 
out" I have the utmost sympathy for him and his family, but 
I think this little girl has been wronged. I think the whole 
thing is wrong and that he ought to be punished now. That is 
my position, and I hope I have not stated anything I should not 
have stated. 
The Court: I think if it would · do this young lady any good 
it would be all right, but the law is not punishing him on her ac-
count, but on account of the public. It is not going 
page 18 } to do her or anybody any good except this, that it 
might be a pretty positive statement· that the laws of 
the Commonwealth be enforced in this case. Under the cir-
cumstances, and because of the position of the Commonwealth 
in the matter, I am going to overrule my suggestion unless you 
want me to overrule it as a motion for probation. . 
Mr. Widener: Yes, sir, we do want to move for probation on 
the grounds appearing in the record, and for the reason that no 
reason has been given whatever that this man is not entitled to. 
probation if anybody ever was in the Court. That's all I think, 
that this case is higher than the wishes of the parties in the csse, 
and the Court's suggestion on his own motion as to the probation 
of this boy should be followed. It is far more just :to this boy 
than to consult the wishes of any of the individual private parties 
concerned. · 
The Court: The Commonwealth .takes a very positive stand 
against it, and I believe maybe the Court would be going a little 
further. than it ought to go. My position is not one of sympathy 
for this defendant. I sympathize with these two women more 
than this defendant. 
I suppose all this will go in the record? 
Mr. Widener: Yes, sir, and I desire this to go in the record, 
also. A good deal has been said by the other side about this 
girl, Ruby Barr, being pregnant. We affirm that she is not, 
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the defendant -has never said that she was, he stands 
page 19 ~ ready to make an additional affidavit that she is not, 
. and if it would make any difference we could procure 
undeniable proof that she is not. We know what we are talking 
about. 
Mr. Hutton: May I ask, in view of your statement, whether 
defendant is living :with his present wife? · 
Mr. Widener: I do not know. 
The Court (to defendant):· Stand up, please. In response to 
your plea of guilty and argument of counsel for the Common-
wealth ,~nd for yourself, it is the Court's opinion to find you 
guilty'anq to sentence you to a term of two years in the State 
Penitentiary. 
Mr. Widener: We except· to the ruling of the Court and to all 
of the actions of the Court, denying the motion for the with-
drawal of the plea, denying probation or investigation as to the 
propriety of probation, and to the sentence of the defendant by 
the Court. · 
The Court: Do you want a suspension of the execution of 
sentence for sixty days? . 
Mr. Widener: I wonder if your Honor would object to suspend-
ing the execution for ninety days. 
The Court: No, I don't think so. I will suspend it for ninety 
days and give him a chance to get it in the Supreme Court. 
page 20 r JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
vs. 
Joe Parris. 
The undersigned Judge of the Circuit Court of Washington 
County, Virginia, hereby certifies that the foregoing incidents 
of the proceedings on defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Plea 
of Guilty (which proceedings were had on June 28, 1948), em-
bracing "Argument of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Pk a 
of Guilty," and embracing all proceedings had in this cause fol-
lowing defendant'·s plea of guilty, on defendant's motion in writ-
ing for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, filed on June 28, 
1948, and his additional statement in grounds for withdrawing 
plea of guilty filed on June 28, 1948, was on August 26, 1948, 
and within sixty days of the final judgment herein, presented to 
me for authentication, and it appearing that the Attorney for 
the Commonwealth has had due and timely notice of this applica-
tion, and that the said record of said proceed_ings is correct, full 
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and complete in all respects, it is hereby certified and authenti-
cated as a true transcript of all of the proceedings in this cause 
had on the "Argument of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his 
Plea of Guilty/' and on "Additional Statement in Grounds for 
Withdrawing Plea of Guilty," and the same is transmitred to 
the Clerk of said Court to be filed with and made a part of the 
record in this case. 
This 4th day of September, 1948, and within seventy 
page 21 } days of the final judgment herein. . 
page 22 }. 
WALTER H. ROBERTSON, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Washington County, Virginia. 
ORDER. 
(Entered June 28, 1948, Law Order 
Book "Z," page 164.) 
This day came the attorney for the Commonwealth as well as 
the attorney assisting the Commonwealth, and also the.attorneys 
for the defendant and the defendant in person who appeared 
according to his recognizance; and the defendant filed his motion 
· for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty and entered at a former 
date of this term together with an "additional statement and 
grounds for withdrawing plea of guilty" which motion and addi-
tional statement were in writing, verified by the defendant, and 
the motion was argued by counsel. Said motion and the argu-
ments and proceedings thereon are made a part of the record. 
Whereupon the Court overruled the motion of the defendant 
to withdraw hi~ plea of guilty and the defendant, by counsel, 
excepted. . . 
Whereupon following a remark of the Court defendant moved 
that sentence be suspended for a reasonable time for a reference 
to the probation officer to investigate and report whether or not 
it was a proper case for probation, but the attorney for the Com-
monwealth and his assistant counsel opposed such reference to 
the probation officer, and thereupon the defendant formally 
moved the Court that sentence be suspended for a reasonable 
time for such investigation by the probation officer and moved 
for probation, which motions were likewise opposed by 
page 23 ~ the attorney for the Commonwealth and his assistant 
and the Court overruled said motion, to which action 
of the Court the defendant, "by couns~l, excepted. 
Thereupon it was demanded of the defendant· if anything 
he kne:w or had to say why the Court should not sentence him 
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according to law and nothing further being said or offered in 
delay of judgment it is considered by the Court that said Joe 
Parris in accordance with his plea of guilty is guilty of seduc-
tion and that he be confined in the penitentiary of the Common-
wealth for a term of two years. It js further ordered that the 
Clerk of the Court notify the superintendent of the penitentiary 
and transmit to him according to law a copy hereof, to all of 
which actions of the Court, the defendant, by counsel, excepted. 
The defendant indicating his desir~ to apply for. a writ of 
error and supersedeas, it is ordered that the execution of said sen-
tence be suspended for ninety (90) days; and the recognizance 
heretofore entered into by the said Joe Parris and his bondsmen 
is continued, upon· the further condition that the said Joe Parris 
make his personal appearance before this Court on the 27th day 
of September, 1948, at 10:00 o'clock A. M. 
page 24 ~ .Virginia: 
WALTER H. ROBERTSON, 
Judge. 
In the Circuit Court of Washington County: 
I; C. N. Booth, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Washington 
County, Virginia, do certify that the -foregoing is a true tran-
script in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Joe Parris 
pending in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Virginia; 
I further certify that R. E. Boucher, Esq., Attorney for the 
Commonwealth, and T. L. Hutton, Esq., Assistant Counsel for 
the Commonwealth, have had due notice of the application of 
the defendant for a transcript of the record in sa.id case. 
Given under my hand this September 25th, 1948. 
A Copy-:""" Teste: 
C. N. BOOTH, 
Clerk. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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